

The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

18 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

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National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT:

Monthly Warning Reports for April 1987

Summary of Key Warning Issues:

Pakistan/Afghanistan/USSR

There has been a sharp rise in Soviet military pressure along the Pakistani border this year, including stepped up subversive activities, dramatically increased air violations and crossborder attacks. The popular perception that the Soviets are behind recent bombings in Pakistan are making Pakistani leaders more jittery. NIO/NESA notes that Soviet actions suggest Moscow is willing to take greater risks and has decided it can no longer live with the status quo in Afghanistan. Greater subversive efforts in Pakistan are likely.

Western Europe/US

This year's summit in Venice, like previous ones, is likely to be skewed by late-breaking events. INF negotiations are the most likely wild card, notes NIO/Europe, and the Soviets may seek to sow intra-alliance discord by pushing for an early response to Gorbachev's proposal or by broaching new initiatives. With Italian and British elections also scheduled in June, Andreotti or others may try to capture the limelight by pushing a joint initiative on the Middle East or Third World debt.

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Chad/Libya

In the next several months, notes NIO/Africa, Chadian President Habre is likely to move into the Tibesti region and attack Libyan forces at Aozou. Prospects for success are good, but the Chadians will have major logistical problems if fighting becomes protracted. US and French policies in Chad are diverging;

Meanwhile, Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks are likely, with Habre the ultimate target. Libyan subversive efforts in Sudan and Niger also may grow.

Sudan

Anti-Sadiq feeling in Sudan is at an all-time high, and domestic and Libyan plotting against Sadiq continues. The Libyan threat to US nationals in Khartoum is growing. An insurgent offensive in the south is likely and will garner some successes, putting new stresses on Sadiq and the military leadership.

Argentina

Support for President Alfonsin from the military is fragile, and unrest will continue if Alfonsin cannot live up to his secret agreement containing human rights investigations and trials. NIO/Warning notes that more opportunities for overambitious Army officers to create serious trouble for the civilian presidency appear likely.

Nicaragua/Honduras

NIO/Latin America notes that despite the insurgents current strong performance, their logistics system remains fragile. If the insurgents fail to cache adequate supplies or aerial resupply falters, large-scale exfiltrations may be necessary. NIO/Warning notes that the small Sandinista presence within Honduras and along the border continues the potential for Nicaraguan forces to fire on US personnel in Honduras.

2. Trend Commentary

USSR/Mongolia

Based on experience in monitoring Soviet troops withdrawals in other locations, NIO/USSR notes that it will before we can precisely assess how much--if at all--Soviet military capabilities in Mongolia have been drawn down.

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USSR/Mid-East

The Soviet objective in courting Israel is to secure acquiescence for a Soviet role in an Arab-Israeli peace conference. In concluding a debt agreement with Egypt, the Soviets have paved the way for broader ties. Moscow is taking advantage of Syria's near-total isolation in the region to pursue policies, particularly the promotion of Palestinian unity, that are at odds with those of Damascus. The Intelligence Community differs on the impact of Moscow's renewed activism. Some argue Moscow may make enough concessions to Israel and pressure Syria sufficiently to raise expectations about a peace conference so high that the US is placed in a reactive posture, especially with Arab moderates.

Yugoslavia

Economic factors are heightening pressures on the central government, and the potential for unrest may grow. Incipient instability would be signaled by any of several indicators: politically-motivated strikes unrelated to wages; increased ethnic tensions or tighter security precautions in Macedonia or Kosovo; tougher policies by the tolerant leaderships of Serbia and Slovenia; or preparations for a crackdown by the security and military committees of the State Presidency.

Greece/Turkey

Last month's Aegean crisis demonstrated how quickly the two sides can approach a war footing. Greece's willingness to mobilize its forces during this crisis may make the Turks more likely to follow suit the next time around. The Aegean dispute is complicating US-Turkish DECA negotiations. While abrogating DECA now would be unlikely, the Turks may slow down military cooperation called for in the DECA.

South Korea

President Chun will manipulate the legal and constitutional mechanisms for succession to ensure his control over the choice of a new president this year. The electoral process so strongly favors the pro-government party that there is likely to be no need for ballot stuffing; in fact, NIO/East Asia notes that the problem may be ensuring that the opposition carries enough electors to make the election appear credible. The military will have a key voice in the succession, and the potential for instability will increase if Chun alienates the middle class and enhances the appeal of radical elements by blatantly manipulating the succession mechanisms. Even if succession this year is relatively smooth, once the Olympics are over, the issue of constitutional reform will arise again with, NIO/Warning notes, even greater potential for divisiveness.

Egypt

Egypt will face an economic crisis in the next six months if it falls out of compliance with the IMF standby agreement or fails to implement the first series of economic reforms. The Intelligence Community, however, believes the odds are less than even that this will occur because Mubarak wants to maintain prospects for additional aid from the US and the Gulf States. Nonetheless, inflation—already 30 percent annually—will affect Mubarak's popularity with the middle class, and the views of public sector employees—whose relations with the government already are bad—will be an important indicator of opposition to Mubarak. NIO/Warning also notes that the stability of the Egyptian government and its relations with the US and Israel depend on Mubarak—a constant target for assassination by external and internal foes.

Philippines

The Communist Party of the Philippines probably has not decided to target US personnel specifically for attack, notes NIO/East Asia, but there may be little additional warning were such a decision to be made.

Peru

President Garcia's popularity remains his major strength in dealing with the military, but his efforts to create a Ministry of Defense threaten to estrange the military permanently from the administration. Additionally, the Armed Forces remains disillusioned with Garcia's lackluster counterinsurgency strategy. Civil-military tensions could be rekindled at any time, and while a coup is unlikely any time soon, it cannot be ruled out if Garcia's position deteriorates significantly in the coming months.

Uganda

Government control of the countryside is slipping, and Uganda appear headed toward domestic instability. Relations with Kenya probably will worsen, and human rights violations may again become a major irritant with the US.

3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of continuing warning concern:

India/China

Both China and India continue to improve their military readiness in the disputed broder area. Forward outposts could be overrun at any time with little additional warning, and recent moves by both sides suggest efforts to prepare for more serious operations.

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Suriname		
Movement toward a new const perpetuate the military in powe	itution and dates for an election ar r. Governmental collapse remains po	e means to ssible.

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